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ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
1. Error in Court refusing defendant the right of 
cross-examination. 
2. Error in Courf s refusal to permit evidence of 
warranty. 
3. Error in Court taking position that response to 
leading questions would be ignored whether objected to 
or not. 
4. Error in Court's failure to impose duty on vendor 
to furnish equipment that would sustain its own weight and 
refusal to impose liability for damages directly and natur-
ally resulting therefrom in the ordinary course of events. 
5. Error under the facts submitted to impose duty on 
vendor to furnish equipment capable of moving items of 
weight represented by vendee to be moved. 
6. Error in Court's refusal to apply the law charging 
vendor with damages sustained directly and naturally and 
within the contemplation of the parties. 
7. Error of the Court in finding that the defendant 
vendee was warned of probable failure of performance be-
cause of long wheel base since same is contrary to the 
evidence. 
8. Error of the defendant in finding vendee had re-
quested the truck delivered since such finding is contrary 
to the evidence. 
9. Finding that vendee could have corrected the de-
fective equipment is contrary to the evidence and such 
finding cannot sustain the judgment being contrary to 
the law. 
10. Error in the Court finding that vendee knew what 
the difficulty was or could have known by the exercise of 
reasonable diligence and error in concluding as a matter 
of law that such a finding would sustain the judgment 
as entered. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant and counter-claimant was a contractor en-
gaged in road building for about 25 years, R 87. Plaintiff 
operated an automotive truck sales agency in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, R 77. Defendant entered into negotiations for 
the purchase of a truck, in response to an advertisement, 
with an agent of the plaintiff, R 88, 89. The truck was to 
be used in road building work and defendant specified the 
particular type of a truck, referred to in the transcript as 
one like the "Strong" truck, or "Strong & Grant" truck. 
This truck was understood by the parties to be capable of 
hauling a 25 ton Cat., R 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 178, 250, 
288, 289, 290, 293. The plaintiffs had sold the particular 
"Strong" truck in question, and the defendant had seen 
the same and ordered one exactly like the "Strong" truck, 
see Exhibit 1 for contract of sale, and R 136, 289, 370. 
Thereafter plaintiff approached defendant and indicated 
that the truck plaintiff had sold defendant might not be 
entirely satisfactory, and that defendant should have a dif-
ferent type truck costing several thousand dollars more and 
recommended and urged defendant to buy a truck of the 
size and dimensions suggested by plaintiff, R 98, 99, 
370, 37 4, 560. Plaintiff went out to the place where de- lrl 
fendant kept all of his equipment to measure some other ~: 
equipment and saw the equipment, including the tanks ~~~ 
and shovels and Cats., and recognized that this equipment 
was to be used and hauled, and at the time of examination ~llii 
it was within the contemplation of the parties that the truck i 
ordered would satisfactorily handle the equipment on the iijtl 
premises, R 100, 101, 103, 521, 522. Defendant acquiesced jr 
and permitted plaintiff to place the order for the newly ~c1 
suggested truck costing $16,522.00 and cancelled the order J~, 
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for the truck originally ordered under Exhibit 1, upon the 
recommendations of the plaintiff that he do so, R 99, 100, 
101, 103, Exhibit 1. 
Trucks were very hard to secure and purchase and it 
was almost impossible to buy one without waiting a year 
or more for delivery of same, R 111, 532. Defendant re-
ceived delivery of the buck and each time he attempted 
to use the same the front tires would blow out and they 
would get so warm that they would catch on fire and bum 
because of the excess weight on the front end, R 121, 122, 
125, 126. Front tires blew out when the truck was empty, 
R 125. The front tires would blow out because of the truck 
being improperly designed and the weight all shifted onto 
the front, R 123. Because of the long wheel base the drive 
shafts were so long that they would whip and tear out, 
R 116, 118, 120, 193, and the defendant did replace them 
and sued for the recovery for replacing these drive shafts 
on the improperly designed truck, R 6. The defendant did 
not know what was wrong with the truck, or what caused 
tires to blow out, R 113, 545. Both plaintiff and defendant 
weighed the front end of the truck at the suggestion of 
a tire dealer who refused to sell new tires to be used on 
the truck, which weighing was done prior to the time that 
defendant sustained damage caused by the plaintiff, R 128, 
129, 130. The tire dealer told plaintiff and defendant the 
front end was overloaded when empty and gave this as the 
reason why he would not sell new tires for the truck. The 
plaintiff was not skilled in truck designing and the plain-
tiff purported to be skilled and represented himself as an 
authority on the matter, and the tire dealer indicated that 
the tires would blow out if the truck were operated empty 
since the front was overloaded when driven empty, R 128, 
129, 130. 
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Plaintiff had a contract for hauling 63 carloads of oil 
for road building near McGill, Nevada, which oil was to 
be hauled in the late summer of 1947, and plaintiff was 
fully informed of the oil hauling contract, R 103, 139, 140. 
It cost the defendant to haul this oil by rail $25,834.00, see 
Exhibit 4 and R 140. Defendant could have hauled the 
same by using this truck, had the truck been properly 
designed, as it was later changed and redesigned, for a 
total cost to the defendant of $5,000.00, which would in-
clude depreciation, costs of operation and all costs for the 
hauling of the entire 63 carloads of oil, R 168, 145, 146, 
147, 338. The oil was hauled subsequent to June of 1947, 
and the defendant was thereby damaged in the sum of 
$20,000.00, being the difference between what it cost the 
plaintiff to haul the oil by rail, Exhibit 4, and what the oil 
could have been hauled for, had the truck been so built 
as to permit the hauling of the same, or had it been altered, 
as it was later altered in design, to permit satisfactory 
operation. The truck purchased from the plaintiff was re-
quired to remain idle from the time it was purchased until 
it was redesigned. Mter the oil had been hauled by rail 
and after many contacts requesting that the truck be re-
designed vendor plaintiff received a newly designed truck 
which was of the same general construction except that 
it was engineered and designed and properly balanced. 
Plaintiff vendor told defendant that this was a newly de-
signed truck properly balanced and that he could bring 
his truck in now and that they could redesign the truck 
using the newly designed truck on the floor as a sample, 
R 392, 393, 514, 515, 519. This remodeling and redesigning 
of the truck consisted of the cutting off of 5 feet of the 
frame and changing four drive shafts, R 173, 177, 387, 388. 
The redesigning and rebalancing of the chassis using the 
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other truck as a 1nodel was done without cost to the de-
fendant Yendee and took -!0 days, R 133, 363, 394. After 
the redesigning the truck operated satisfactorily and hauled 
a carload of oil on each trip and all other equipment that 
had been represented to be hauled, R 132, 143, 173. The 
same month that the truck was redesigned at no cost to 
the defendant vendee a new set of tires was supplied to 
replace the old ones, R 6. Plaintiff sued to recover for the 
tires that were so supplied to the truck and for the repairs 
to the drive shafts that went out while the truck was 
practically new and was awarded judgment therefore in 
the sum of $1,579.00, R 6, 60. 
Defendant claimed that the tires and drive shafts were 
merely making good the guarantee on the truck, R 116, 
119, 120, 300, and that defendant had been damaged and 
counter-claimed for $20,000.00 claiming that it was within 
the contemplation of the parties that the truck would be 
used for road building and that the fact that the truck 
would not permit the hauling of oil or the hauling of any 
weight resulted in $25,000.00 being expended to haul the 
oil when the same could have been hauled for $5,000.00, 
had the truck been properly designed, R 29, 33, or had 
the same been redesigned prior to June or July in the year 
the oil was hauled. 
The Court refused to permit the claims of the defend-
ant with respect to tires or parts as coming within the 
guarantee and also denied defendant's right to recover 
any damages for selling a truck improperly designed, or 
for furnishing a truck that would not move any weight 
without blowing out its tires. 
Defendant vendee could not change the design with-
out taking a chance of violating a notice that drilling of 
any holes in the frame destroyed the warranty, R 516. De-
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fendant vendee had demanded alterations to be made to 
permit satisfactory operations fifty times, R 542, and had 
done so in May prior to any damage sustained and sued 
for R 133, and had refused to pay for the drive shaft in-
stallations, claiming and requesting modifications prior to 
any damage sustained, R 116, 119. Plaintiff vendee admitted 
certain guarantee, R 300 ,and that the company never 
did advise against building the truck under specifications 
requested by vendor or plaintiff, R 385. 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
\V. J. TREADWAY, VEDA GENE 
TREADWAY, and J. E. TREADWAY, 
co-partners doing business 
under the firm name and style 
of KENNETH SALES COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
HEBER GLENN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
No. 7417 
Case 
Defendant and Counter-claimant was a contractor en-
gaged in road building for more than 17 years. The plain-
tiff operated an automotive truck sales agency in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. Defendant entered into negotiations for the 
purchase of a truck in response to an advertisement with 
an agent of plaintiff. The truck was to be used in road 
building work and defendant specified the particular type 
of a truck referred to in the transcript as one like "the 
Strong Truck," or "Strong & Grant Truck." This truck was 
known by all parties to be capable of hauling a 25 ton Cat. 
The plaintiff had sold the particular "Strong" truck in ques-
tion and the defendant had seen the same and ordered one 
exactly like the "Strong" truck, Exhibit 1. Thereafter, the 
plaintiff approached defendant and indicated that plaintiff's 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
agent had sold defendant a truck that might not be entirely 
satisfactory and that he should have a different type truck 
costing several thousand dollars more, and recommended 
and urged him to buy a truck of size and dimensions sug-
gested by the plaintiff. The plaintiff went out to the place 
of business of the defendant to measure the equipment and 
saw the tanks that were to be put on the truck and the 
Cats. and shovels and equipment that was to be used at 
the time of making the suggestion, and it was within the 
contemplation of the plaintiff and defendant that the truck 
was to be used for the hauling of oil in the tanks and for 
the use by defendant in his road building work, and that 
the truck would at least haul 25 tons. Defendant acquiesced 
and permitted plaintiff to place the order for the newly 
suggested truck costing $16,522.00 and cancelled the order 
for the truck ordered under Exhibit 1 upon the recom-
mendations of the plaintiff that he do so. Trucks were very 
hard to secure and purchase and it was almost impossible 
to buy one without waiting for a year or more to secure 
delivery of the same. 
Defendant received delivery of the truck and each time 
he attempted to use the same the front tires would blow 
out whether the truck was empty or loaded and the drive 
shafts were so long they would whip and break down and 
broke down on two occasions, requiring installations and 
repairs. The plaintiff installed the new drive shafts and 
discussed with the defendant the difficulties in connection 
with the blowing of tires when riding empty prior to the 
time of the damages sustained by the defendant for which 
defendant counter-claimed for damages. The defendant 
did not know what was wrong with the truck or what 
caused the tires to blow out. Both plaintiff and defendant 
weighed the front end of the truck at the suggestion of a 
fu, 
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tire dealer who refused to sell new tires for the truck prior 
to the time that any damages were sustained by defendant 
and. determined that there was too much weight on the 
front end of the truck. The tire dealer told plaintiff and 
defendant the front was overloaded when empty and gave 
this as the reason why he would not sell new tires for the 
truck. The defendant was not skilled in truck designing, 
and the plaintiff purported to be skilled and represented 
himself as an authority on the matter. 
The plaintiff had a contract for hauling 63 carloads of 
oil for road building near McGill, Nevada, which oil was 
to be hauled in the summer of 1947. It cost the defendant 
to haul the same by railroad $25,834.00, Exhibit 4. Defend-
ant could have hauled the same by his truck, had the truck 
been properly designed, as it was later changed and as 
redesigned for a cost of $5,000.00, which would include 
depreciation and all costs of operation of the truck for 
hauling the entire 63 carloads of oil. The oil was to be 
hauled subsequent to June, 1947, and defendant was there-
by damaged in the sum of $20,000.00, being the difference 
what it cost to haul and what the oil could have been 
hauled for, had the truck been so built as to permit the 
hauling of the same. The truck purchased from the plaintiff 
was required to remain idle all this time because it could 
not be operated without blowing out the front tires. Mter 
the oil had all been hauled by rail plaintiff vendor had 
another truck delivered to his place of business which was 
the same truck in almost each respect as that delivered to 
defendant except that it was properly designed, weight 
balanced and had a shorter wheel base. This newly designed 
truck was delivered to plaintiff's place of business about one 
year after defendant had received the truck involved in 
this litigation. After having made many demands the plain-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
tiff took the defendant's truck into his place of business 
and used the other newly designed truck as a design and· 
model to redesign and shorten the wheel base of the truck 
that had been sold to the defendant. This remodeling and 
redesigning of the truck consisted of the cutting off of five 
feet of the frame ,the moving of the rear wheel assembly 
forward and the changing of the four interconnecting drive 
shafts. This redesigning and the rebalancing of the chassis 
was done without cost to the defendant and thereafter the 
truck operated satisfactorily and hauled a carload of oil on 
each trip. The same month the truck was redesigned at 
no cost a new set of tires was supplied to replace the old 
ones. The plaintiff sued to recover for the tires that were 
so supplied to the truck and for the repairs to the drive 
shafts that went out while the truck was practically new 
and was awarded judgment therefore in the sum of 
$1,579.00. 
Defendant claimed that the tires and the drive shafts 
were merely making good the guarantee on the truck, and 
that the defendant had been damaged and counter-claimed 
for $20,000.00, claiming that it was within the contempla-
tion of the parties that the truck was to be used for road 
building and that the fact that the truck would not permit 
the hauling of the oil, or hauling of anything even its own 
weight, resulted in $25,000.00 being expended to haul the 
oil when the same could have been hauled for $5,000.00, 
had the truck operated properly or had the same been 
redesigned prior to June or July. The lower Court refused 
to permit the claims of the defendant with respect to the tr, 
furnishing of the tires or the parts as coming within the w1 
guarantee and also denied defendant's right to recover any r~ 
damages for the improper designing of the truck, or fur- ill( 
nishing a truck that would not even move its own weight. k 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
ERROR IN REFUSING DEFENDANT RIGHT OF 
CROSS-EXAMINATION. 
The plaintiff was suing for the items listed in the Bill 
of Particulars, R 6. These items included a set of tires, in-
volving over One Thousand Dollars, and the replacing of 
two sets of drive shafts. The defendant should have been 
entitled to cross-examine the plaintiff on the issue of 
whether the tires were second grade war tires or whether 
they were merely replacing tires blown out by improper 
designing of the truck and whether they were factory re-
placements without cost to plaintiff, whether or not the 
drive shafts as replaced were replaced within the period 
that the plaintiff had guaranteed the truck. What the 
guarantee consisted of. Whether it was for a year or ten 
thousand miles of operation that the guarantee extended. 
Whether or not the extreme length of the truck, together 
with the extra long interconnecting drive shafts caused a 
whipping motion, tearing the same out and whether this 
should have been replaced by the plaintiff under factory 
guarantee, or under a guarantee from the plaintiff as the 
dealer. Whether the factory paid for the tires or parts. 
Note that at R 82, when the Court sustained an objec-
tion and defendant's attorney attempts to explain the reason 
for the request to continue, the Court sharply interrupts 
the attorney for the defendant, refuses to permit him to 
even give his reasons, or continue cross-examination with 
the sharp response, "The Court has ruled, Mr. Schoenhals. 
You may proceed." Note also that the Court in its ruling 
did not extend to counsel the usual courtesy of permitting 
him to complete his reason for cross-examination, the re-
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porter indicating by dashes that the Court was talking at 
the same time that the attorney for the defendant was talk-
ing. Counsel for defendant has never heretofore experi-
enced or even heard of a case where the defendant was so 
curtly denied the right of cross-examination without being 
even permitted to give to the Court the reasons therefore 
and being stopped in the middle of a sentence of explana-
tion and notified that the Court had ruled. 
70 C. J. p. 611 
"§779 A party has a right to cross-examine wit-
nesses who have testified for the adverse party and 
this right is absolute and not a mere privilege 33 
and, unless subject to cross-examination, a witness 
cannot testify, 34 and it is not within the discretion 
of the Court to say whether or not the right will be 
accorded 35 ~ ~ " 
There are many cases cited, among them a Utah case, 
as well as an A. L. R. citation. 
70 C. J.p. 615 
"§ 782 The right to cross-examine witnesses 0 0 
being absolute, 76 it should not be abridged 77 ° 0 " 
Note also that again another Utah case is cited. 
58 Am. Jur. p. 340 
"§ In a judicial investigation the right of cross-
examination is absolute and not a mere privilege of 
the one against whom a witness may be called 19." 
Note here a Utah case is cited. 
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58 Am. Jur. p. 340 
"§ 612 It is generally held that he is entitled to 
have the direct testimony stricken from the record." 
Here we see again that the Court goes so far as to 
hold that the evidence given by the plaintiff must be dis-
regarded unless cross-examination is granted. These cases 
go further than saying it is an abuse of discretion and 
hold that it is mandatory to permit cross-examination. The 
manufacturer might have supplied the parts and tires with-
out cost to plaintiff and instructed him to supply same to 
defendant without cost. Yet plaintiff forces defendant to 
pay for same since defendant is not permitted to cross-
examine. 
POINT TWO 
ERROR IN REFUSAL TO PERMIT EVIDENCE OF 
WARRANTY. 
At R 88-89, after having been denied the right of cross-
examination, the defendant, in attempting to introduce into 
the evidence an advertisement in which the vendor holds 
himseH out as a des~gner of trucks and building trucks to 
handle any situation, the defendant is again precluded from 
introducing into the evidence or even examining on the 
question. That such evidence was material and properly 
admissible. 
See: 
55 C. J. p. 683, § 686 
POINT THREE 
ERROR IN COURT TAKING POSITION THAT 
RESPONSE TO LEADING QUESTIONS WOULD BE 
IGNORED WHETHER OBJECTED TO OR NOT. 
At R 104 the Court announced, "I disregard answers 
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to leading questions whether they are objected to or not." 
For the Court to make such a pronouncement places the 
attorney representing a client in a position where he is 
unable to tell which evidence the Court is going to ignore 
and which evidence the Court is going to receive. It like-
wise places the attorney for the client in a position where 
the said client feels that the Court is favoring one side over 
the other. The Court may be in error in holding a certain 
question to be leading. If the Court is in error and just 
ignores the response, the attorney is unable to ask a new 
question satisfactory to the Court to make sure certain 
evidence will be received. It places the attorney in a posi-
tion where the attorney is fearful of proceeding and is un-
nerved, realizing that the Court might ignore any of the 
evidence introduced. If an objection is made and sustained, 
the attorney is then placed in a position of asking a ques-
tion, or at least correcting what the Court concludes to be 
a leading question whether the Court is right or wrong 
so that counsel is certain the Court will consider the evi-
dence. He can then properly try the case and have evi-
dence before the Court which the Court has acknowledged 
as being received, rather than being ignored, without any 
notice to counsel that it has been ignored. The other side 
might welcome a few leading question to speed up the 
trial. Here the Court will not permit this. 
POINT FOUR 
VENDOR REQUIRED TO FURNISH EQUIPMENT 
THAT WILL AT LEAST SUSTAIN ITS OWN WEIGHT 
OR BE RESPONSIBLE FOR DAMAGES DIRECTLY 
AND NATURALLY RESULTING IN THE ORDINARY 
COURSE OF EVENTS. 
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"81-5-7 (6) The measure of damages for breach 
of warranty is the loss directly and naturally result-
ing in the ordinary course of events from the breach 
of warranty."-U. C. A. 1943. 
The legislature has spoken and has fixed the measure 
of damages in cases of this kind: 
ANDRUS v. HORNSBY 
Tex. Civ. App. 238 S. W. 314 
"Loss of profits due to the fact that a truck and 
trailer represented to have a certain capacity had 
a much less capacity was allowed. ~ ~ the buyer 
took the seller to the section of the country where 
he proposed to operate the truck, and explained to 
him the necessity of a truck of a given capacity in 
order to receive the compensation which he ex-
pected. The court said that evidence of loss of profit 
was established with reasonable certainty." 
MAWHINNEY v. PORTEOUS 
17 Manitoba L. R. 184 
" ~ ~ the buyer is entitled as part of his damage 
to compensation for loss of profits from delays 
during the time necessarily elapsing before the 
machine could be put in the condition it was war-
ranted to be in." 
MAYFIELD v. GEORGE 0. RICHARDSON 
MACHINERY CO. 
231 S. W. 288, 208 Mo. App. 206 
"Where a tractor proved worthless, the purchaser 
was entitled to recover the loss of rental value of 
one season's use of the land he was to plow, the 
machine having been sold for plowing purposes and 
warranted to pull a certain number of plows ~ ~ " 
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EXCELLO HOSIERY MILLS v. HIRSCH 
177 Atl. 96, N. J. 
"I am fully satisfied from the testimony adduced 
on behalf of complainant that it had the orders 
which were to be filled by use of the attachments, 
and that the defendant company was apprised and 
knew of these orders and undertook to deliver at-
tachments which it warranted fit and suitable for 
that purpose. The defendant company is therefore 
liable for the special damages consisting of the loss 
of the profits shown to have been sustained. 0 0 " 
SURYAN v. LAKE WASHINGTON SHIPYARDS 
300 Pac. 941, Wash. 
" ~ ~ The defendant next contends that the trial 
court erred in the allowance of damages on items 
1 to 3, inclusive. These three items of damage re-
sulted by reason of the defendant's breach of the 
implied warranty. We have frequently laid down 
the rule that all damages are recoverable that can 
be said to have been reasonably within the con-
templation of the parties at the time the contract 
was entered into as a probable result in case of a 
breach. 0 ~ " 
"The defendant knew that the boat which it 
constructed for the plaintiff was intended for use 
as a fishing boat in Alaskan waters during the 
herring season of 1928; knew that the fishing season 
for herring in those waters was limited; and must 
have contemplated that, if the boat proved unsea-
worthy through its faulty construction, it might 
become necessary, when stress of weather arose, to 
jettison the cargo and seek aid in order to save the 
lives of the crew and bring the helpless boat into 
port. So far as concerns the allowance for loss of 
profits during the time the boat was laid up for 
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necessary repairs, as awarded by the trial court on 
item 1, it is sufficient to say that this court is com-
mitted to the doctrine that, in such a case as this, 
prospective profits may be the basis of recovery if 
they can be estimated with reasonable certainty. 0 0 " 
" 
0 
° From this evidence the trial court found 
that the plaintiff had lost in catch on those two days 
800 barrels:~ and we are not disposed to disturb this 
finding.'' 
AMERICAN OIL PUMP & TANK CO. v. FOUST 
27 4 Pac. 323, Ore. 
"
0 0 The defendant was entitled to equipment 
which would operate:~ and to its daily use in his 
business. A return to him of the payments he had 
made upon the purchase price would not compen-
sate him for his full damages, because he had pur-
chased the equipment for use in a business which 
was bringing him a profit. Both parties apparently 
assumed that such a pump should render service 
for more than five months' time. When it ceased 
to operate, in the latter part of December, the de-
fendant was unable to supply his customers with 
gasoline. While there is no evidence upon the sub-
ject, we assume that similar pumps could be pur-
chased from other manufacturers, and could be in-
stalled before any great period of time had passed. 
The court's instructions authorized the jury to allow 
the defendant compensation for such "a reasonable 
time within which he could have removed this pump 
and replaced it with a workable and usable 
one. o o o , 
"But it is to be observed That, in our case, there 
was substantial evidence to the effect that the plain-
tiff knew that the defendant expected to use this 
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device in the operation of a business for profit. In 
such instances, where the loss of profits in the event 
of a breach, was within the contemplation of the 
parties, a recovery limited to the rental value of the 
device may not compensate fairly for the loss sus-
tained during the period while an efficient machine 
is being substituted for the defective one; the lost 
profits are sometimes recoverable. Feeney & B. Co. 
v. Stone, 89 Or. 360, 171 P. 569, 17 4 P. 152. See 
the comprehensive note accompanying California 
Press Mfg. Co. v. Stafford Pack. Co., 192 Cal. 
479 -(!. -(!. " 
"Such being the circumstance the court was of 
necessity driven to the adoption of another measure 
of compensation for the period of substitution of 
equipment. It instructed the jury that, in determin-
ing the value of the use of the pump, "you would 
be entitled to consider what his (defendant's) 
average earnings had been over the five or six 
months preceding the 27th day of December, 1925, 
when it appears from the evidence that the pump 
became unusable, merely for whatever it may be 
worth to you in determining what was the reason-
able value of the use of the pump to the defendant." 
-o. -o. We do not believe that this instruction was 
erroneous; 
LOBDELL v. PARKER 
3 La. 328 
"It was held that for breach of warranty on the 
sale of machinery for a sugar mill, due to defects 
which rendered it unfit for the purpose intended, 
might include the loss of profits on the sugar and 
molasses which the buyer failed to make; the court, 
however, said that these must not be valued at the 
price at which they could have been sold in market, 
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for the expense of grinding, manufacturing, carry-
ing to market, etc., must be taken into considera-
ti 
, 
on. 
JORGENSEN v. GESSELL PRESSED BRICK CO. 
45 Utah 31, 141 P. 460 
"The measure of damages for breach of warranty 
is the loss directly and naturally resulting, in the 
ordinary course of events, from the breach of war-
ranty. This is the ordinary rule as to general dam-
ages. But there may be a recovery in a proper case 
for special as well as general damages, and such 
damages as may fairly be supposed to have been 
within the contemplation of the parties as a proba-
ble result of the breach are included.'' 
OLIVER FARM EQUIPMENT SALES CO. 
v. RICH 
42 P. 2d 604, Kan . 
.. ~ ~ The Court held that where a manufacturer 
sells a machine on a written order, describing it, 
an express warranty of quality will not exclude an 
implied warranty that the machine will do the things 
necesarily implied by the description. There is 
nothing in the express warranty which destroys the 
obligation of the seller to deliver the engine de-
scribed in the order. It is a matter of common knowl-
edge that an engine that will neither develop nor 
sustain power is of no value." 
.. Another objection was in allowing the defend-
ant to testify that the tractor was worthless to him, 
and which was not stricken out on the motion of 
plaintiff. That was an issue in the case as made by 
the pleadings, and the tests were made showing that 
it was of no value to the plaintiff who purchased it 
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for work which it failed to perform. It may not be 
the best evidence of the fault in the tractor, but it 
is clear that it was not material error." 
STUDEBAKER BROS. CO. v. ANDERSON 
50 U. 319, 167 Pac .. 663 
" (t (t The defendants (the buyers) according 
to the undisputed testimony, applied to the plaintiff 
for an automobile to use for a special purpose-
'something to carry people to and from the New 
Grand Hotel and depot.' The plaintiff's salesman 
met the defendants' application by representing it 
had just such a car, 'We have exactly what you 
want 0 0 0 ' We think from the foregoing state-
ments made concerning the particular car in ques-
tion something more was to be implied, as matter 
of law, than that the plaintiff could sell the defend-
ants a junk pile for an automobile, and then escape 
liability therefor by saying such statements were 
only 'seller's talk' 0 0 " 
No question but what plaintiff sold defendant a junk 
pile. 
ROYAL PAPER BOX CO. v. MUNRO & 
CHURCH CO. 
188 N. E. 223, 284 Mass. 446 
27 - 4th D. - 1103 
"Mass. 1934. Damages for breach of implied 
warranty that cardboard was fit for candy boxes 
were not merely difference between value of card-
board as it was and value as it should have been, 
but included damages resulting from reasonable 
attempt to use cardboard prior to date when buyer 
acquired knowledge of its condition. G. L., Ter. 
Ed., c. 106, § 17 ( 1) .'' 
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GARY COAST AGENCY v. LA WREY 
101 Or. 629, 201 Pac. 214 
"When the buyer of an automotive truck in-
formed the seller, a dealer, of the purpose for which 
the truck was to be used, and the latter represented 
that it was fit for that purpose, there was an implied 
warranty of fitness. [Gary Coast Agency v. Lawrey 
( 1921)] 101 Or. 629, 201 Pac. 214; Long v. Five-
Hundred Co. ( 1923) 123 Wash. 347, 212 Pac. 559." 
46 AM. JUR. 829 
"§ 705. 0 0 Where there is a contract to sell an 
article, such as a machine, for use by the buyer in 
the performance of a collateral contract the terms 
and conditions of which are known to the seller, 
and the contract to sell is broken by a wrongful 
failure or refusal to deliver or by a late delivery, 
which breach results in a loss of profits to the buyer 
in the performance of the collateral contract, such 
loss of profits has been regarded in some cases as 
being within the contemplation of the parties, and 
the seller has been held liable therefor6 0 0 " 
RUDOLPH WURLITZER CO. v. 
KAUFMAN STRAUS CO. 
116 S. W. 2nd 305 
" 
0 0 The statute, section 2651b-69, further 
gives to a purchaser the right to recover any loss 
directly and naturally resulting in the ordinary 
course of events from the breach of a warranty. The 
evidence tended to prove that the plaintiff had lost 
certain business by reason of the improper refrigera-
tion of its fur storage plant, and we think this was 
properly submitted." 
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Note in the above case that with respect to the identi-
cal statute that the Court would require judgment for 
counter-claimant in the case at Bar. 
See also: 
RUSSELL v. CORNING MFG. CO., 49 Appl. Div. 
610, 63 NYS 640; COHN v. BESSEMER GAS ENGINE 
CO., 44 Cal. A. 85, 186 P. 200; SINKER v. KIDDER, 
24 N. E. 341; MAYFIELD v. GEORGE 0. RICHARD-
SON MACH. CO., 208 Mo. A 206, 231 SW 288; WOOD 
v. CARLETON, 3 Silv. Sup. 509, 6 NYS 865; DENIVELLE 
CO. v. LEONARD KEIL, 140 NYS 150; DWYER v. RED-
MOND 100 Conn. 393; HACKETT v. LEWIS, 173 Pac. 
111; FARMERS BANK OF TRENTON v. RAY & SON, 
167 S. W. 2d 963; BRYSON v. McCONE, 121 Cal. 153, 
53 Pac. 637; FINDLEY vs. BREEDLOVE, 4 Mart. N. W. 
(La) 105; ST. MARYS MACH. CO. v. COOK, 187 Ky. 
112, 218 S. W. 733; MONACI v. TURNER et al, 98 Pac. 
2d 755; LORRAINE MFG. CO. v. ALLEN MFG. CO. 
234 Pac. 1055; ELCO SHOE MFG. CO. v. THATCHER, 
203 N. W 669, IOWA MFG CO. v. BALDWIN, 82 S. W. 
2d 994; BARRETT CO. v. PANTHER RUBBER MFG. 
CO., 24 F. 2d 329; AMERICAN OIL PUMP & TANK CO. 
v. FOUST, 27 4 P. 322, 128 Or. 263, LIQUID CARBONIC 
CO. v. COCLIN, 164 S. E. 895, 166 S. C. 400; JONES v. 
HOLLAND FURNACE CO., 206 N. W. 56, 188 Wis. 394; 
MURRAY CO. v. PUTMAN, 61 Tex. Civ. App. 517, 130 
S. W. 631; CHISHOLM & M. MFG. CO. v. UNITED 
STATES CANOPY CO., 111 Tenn. 202, 77 S. W. 1062; 
AULTMAN & T. MACHINERY CO .v. CAPPLEMAN, 36 
Tex. Civ. App. 523, 81 S. W. 1243; JANNEY MFG. CO. 
v. BANTA, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 1089, 83 S. W. 130. 
There can be no question but what the damages here 
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sustained were within the contemplation of the parties. 
The evidence is conclusive that the truck would not carry 
its own weight without blowing out tries, much less any 
portion of the road building equipment. After the truck 
had been altered the defendant and counter-claimant was 
then able to use it for every purpose for which it had been 
intended in the first instance. Under the evidence sub-
mitted and under the law the Court should have rendered 
judgment for the counter-claimant for Twenty Thousand 
Dollars and was under obligation to do so. Exhibit 4 is 
conclusive evidence of the cost of $25,834.00 to defendant. 
Appellee should be embarrased to claim this as speculative 
damages. 
POINT FIVE 
VENDOR RESPONSIBLE TO FURNISH EQUIP-
MENT CAPABLE OF MOVING ITEMS REPRESENTED 
BY VENDEE TO BE MOVED. 
The plaintiff knew that the defendant counter-claimant 
was in the road constructing business. On Exhibit 1 the 
plaintiff represented this equipment was capable of moving 
25 tons, and when supplying a truck which costs thousands 
of dollars more than the truck described in Exhibit 1, 
represented that it would haul at least 25 ton or better. 
The evidence shows it would not even move its own weight 
when empty without blowing the front tires, much less 
25 tons. That the front tires got so hot they smoked, 
R 125. From the authorities cited under Point Four, it is 
obvious that it was the duty of the Court to render judg-
ment against plaintiff for Twenty Thousand Dollars on the 
Counter-Claim. 
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POINT SIX 
VENDOR CHARGEABLE WITH DAMAGES SUS-
TAINED DIRECTLY AND NATURALLY RESULTING 
AND IN CONTEMPLATION OF THE PARTIES. 
The evidence is conclusive that the counter-claimant 
was in no position to secure trucks elsewhere, R 39. The 
counter-claimant showed by unrefuted evidence that he 
sustained a Twenty Thousand Dollar loss by being unable 
to secure any trucks elsewhere and the witness of the plain-
tiff himself testified that the cost of the operation of the 
truck was the same as that claimed by the counter-claimant, 
R 388, or $5,000.00 for the 63 carloads. This means that 
had the Court followed the unrefuted evidence and that 
introduced by the plaintiff's own witnesses that the finding 
of $20,000.00 for counter-claimant was mandatory. 
POINT SEVEN 
FINDING THAT DEFENDANT VENDEE WAS 
WARNED OF PROBABLE FAILURE OF PERFORM-
ANCE BECAUSE OF LONG WHEEL BASE CONTRARY 
TO EVIDENCE. 
The evidence of the vendor is no stronger than it is 
left at its weakest point on cross-examination, R Q9&. 3 iP a_ 
Q. Didn't the engineer tell you it wouldn't work? 
A: No, they didn't tell me it wouldn't work. 
Q: Did you think it would work? 
A: Yes, it did work. 
Q: You think you could load 50,000 pounds on it 
without blowing the front tires out? 
A: Yes. 
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Q: Do you think you could have done that the way 
it was built? 
A: Yes. 
R 8-Ht3!b 
Q: They didn't say the truck would be overloaded 
on the front wheels? 
A: No. 
Q: Just running it empty, they didn't say that? 
A: No. 
Please note that the change of mind with respect to 
the vendor plaintiH came only after on cross-examination, 
counsel requested the Court to order him to bring into I? J 
Court the engineer's reports on the construction of the ' \ 
truck. Having realized that he must now tell the truth on 
this matter, he represents to the Court that the truck was 
engineered properly to haul 54,000 pounds. How can the 
Court under such evidence make a finding that vendee 
was warned of failure of performance when even during 
the trial the vendor still contends that it was satisfactory 
when the evidence was conclusive that the truck would 
blow out its front tires when riding empty? And the front 
end was over weight because of improper design in balance 
when empty. 
POINT EIGHT 
FINDING THAT VENDEE REQUESTED THE 
TRUCK DELIVERED CONTRARY TO THE EVI-
DENCE. 
The vendor himseH at R 278 admitted that the truck 
ordered under Exhibit 1, in his opinion, would not have 
been satisfactory, and that he urged the purchase of the 
truck ultimately delivered. The plaintiff went to the ven-
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dee's home, and suggested a truck different from that in 
Exhibit 1. There is not any evidence of any kind that the 
vendor wanted any truck other than the one described in 
Exhibit 1 and that he took the truck ultimately delivered 
only because of suggestions and representations of the 
vendor plaintiff. 
POINT NINE 
VENDEE OBLIGATED TO CORRECT DEFECT-
IVE EQUIPMENT IS ERROR. 
Defendant vendee was unfamiliar with large trucks 
and their design. Vendee did not recognize what was 
necessary to accomplish the balancing of the truck in the 
designing of same. It was not until a newly designed truck 
was sent down properly designed with weight balances 
that the vendor himself knew what was necessary to do in 
order to accomplish the balancing of the equipment to 
permit it to operate without blowing out the front tires. 
LOUISVILLE N. A. v. SUMNER 
106 Ind. 55, 5 N. E. 404 
81 A. L. R. 282 at 284 
.. The rule does not relate to the performance of 
the primary obligations of contracts. So, where one 
whose duty it is to do work necessary to fulfill a 
contract has equal knowledge of the consequences 
of noncompliance and opportunity to fulfill the ob-
ligation, he alone may be depended on to perform 
the duty, and it will not avail him to say the injured 
party might have performed the duty for him, and 
thus lessened the damages. Louisville, N. A. & C. 
R. Co. v. Sumner 1886, 106, Ind. 55, 55 Am. Rep. 
719, 5 N. E. 404." 
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The Court erred in entering finding paragraph 10, R 57. 
There is absolutely no evidence that defendant knew how 
to redesign the truck or that he could have found any one 
else other than plaintiff who could redesign it. Moreover, 
plaintiff could not redesign same until he had a model to 
work with. Such a finding cannot sustain the conclusion 
of law and the judgment. It was in error under the law 
as submitted in the above captioned case, as well as the 
facts. 
POINT TEN 
FINDING THAT VENDEE KNEW WHAT THE 
DIFFICULTY WAS, OR COULD HAVE KNOWN BY 
EXERCISE OF REASONABLE DILIGENCE CON-
TRARY TO EVIDENCE. 
R 128 indicates that the vendee in attempting to pur-
chase new tires was refused new tires and didn't know the 
reason therefore. R 128 indicates that the dealer thought 
that the weight was balanced and designed so as to throw 
all of the weight on the front. R 129 indicates that the 
vendor plaintiff and vendee defendant both went to the 
city scales to have the truck weighed and discovered that 
the design and balance was such that the truck was over-
loaded when empty on the front wheels each tire should 
carry only 5900 pounds and were required to carry 12,000 
pounds with the truck empty. The fact that a model was 
used for redesigning of the truck to rebalance the weight 
indicates that the vendor designer himself didn't know how 
to accomplish the shifting of weights by design. The 
vendee had a fourth-grade education and cannot be ex-
pected to comprehend truck designing problems that the 
vendor himself didnt' recognize. Moreover, under the 
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theory of the lower Court, the vendee would be required 
to tamper with the vehicle and place himself in a position 
where the vendor could then refuse to act, contending that 
the tampering with the design itself had relieved vendor 
of responsibility and had so modified the construction as 
to make it now impossible to properly correct the original 
defective design. 
Vendor could have contended also that it was the 
tampering of the vendee that had caused the unbalanced 
condition. The lower Court forces vendee to tamper never-
theless or be precluded from damage . 
. Under the Cases Cited and the treatment afforded 
Appellant, the Court should grant a new trial, however 
since the damages suffered are so definite, and convincing 
and conclusive and since the law is certain and no cases 
to the contrary the cause should be remanded with in-
structions to enter judgment for defendant counter-claimant 
as proven for $20,000.00 and a new trial ordered only on 
items sued for in plaintiff's complaint. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. L. SCHOENHALS, 
Attorney for Appellant. 
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